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The title of this article hearkens back to Stanley Kubrick’s brilliant 1964 film, 
Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,2 
released in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and in the context of that 
period’s great debate on Mutually Assured Destruction—or so-called “MAD” 
doctrine—as the roadmap to deterrence and peace in the nuclear age. The MAD 
theory posits that the first use of nuclear weapons will result in massive 
retaliation by the other side leading to the destruction of both sides; hence game 
or strategic theory would predict that no first use will ever be launched.3 Well, 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America. I 
thank Andrew Coley, Columbus School of Law Class of 2019, for his assistance in the 
preparation of this article. 
 
 1 Jeremy Rabkin and John Yoo, STRIKING POWER: HOW CYBER, ROBOTS, AND SPACE 
WEAPONS CHANGE THE RULES FOR WAR (Encounter Books (2017)) [Striking Power]. 
 2 See PETER GEORGE, DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND 
LOVE THE BOMB (1964), summarized in Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964), IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012 (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2019). 
 3 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History 80 (The Penguin Press 2005) 
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for those familiar with the film—and for others, a “spoiler alert”—Kubrick’s 
film points out that the theory did not account for the messiness and irrationality 
of human life. On one hand, the film depicts a stark-raving mad Air Force 
General who viewed “fluoridation of water” for dental health as a covert 
Communist plot to reduce the testosterone levels of American males and who 
has been delegated the authority to launch a nuclear attack. On the other, there 
is a Soviet Premier’s predilection for surprise announcements, including the 
construction of a Soviet “Doomsday device” that, in the logical culmination of 
the MAD theory, would indeed assure the destruction of the whole planet’s 
surface through a robotic and irreversible response to any nuclear denotation in 
Soviet territory. The combination of these two potentially foreseeable human 
and non-human actors, one with too much freedom and the other with too little, 
lead to tragically inhumane results. 
The title turns on one of three characters played by the great British actor, 
Peter Sellers, in a tour de force performance. Dr. Strangelove is the hyper-
rational advisor to the U.S. president, clearly of German origin and impliedly a 
former advisor to Fuhrer Hitler, who does not seem to feel one way or another 
about the situation except to deal with its consequences. Meanwhile the other 
characters include a rather confused and dimwitted president, obsessed with his 
own honor and place in history, and a disabled and frightened British air force 
officer seconded to the staff of the American General responsible for this mess. 
The three characters combine three motivators—rational self-interest, honor, 
and fear—that classical troika thinkers, such as Thucydides, believed could give 
rise to tragedy in human affairs.4 Together, the characters reveal the limits of the 
human condition and dangers of hubris that do not take into account those limits. 
                                                          
(Kennedy Administration Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara believed that sheer terror 
prevented war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Making a virtue of apparent necessity, 
McNamara proclaimed Mutually Assured Destruction as the new national security strategy. 
According to preeminent Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, “its acronym, with wicked 
appropriateness, was MAD. The assumption behind it was that if no one could be sure of 
surviving a nuclear war there would not be one”); See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 750 
(Simon & Shuster 1994) (Writing decades later reflecting on the initial criticism of MAD, 
Henry Kissinger judged that the threat of national suicide was never a credible basis for 
national security strategy. No adversary threatening U.S. interests and allies would consider 
such a threat credible. Hence, MAD was bound to “undermine morale and destroy existing 
alliances.” In Kissinger’s view, developing technology would eventually enable nuclear 
powers to develop strategic defenses to nuclear attack, thus deterring aggression and 
maintaining alliances). 
 4 See Robert Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides, THE LATIN LIBRARY, 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/thucydides1.html (last visited Apr. 7, 
2019) (explaining Athens rise to power, the consequent threat that posed to Greek stability, 
and ultimately the outbreak of the Peloponnesian wars at the fruit of self-interest, honor and 
fear). 
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What does this have to do with Striking Power5 by Professors John Yoo,6 an 
academic lawyer present at the creation of the Global War on Terror in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks, and Jeremy Rabkin,7 a former political scientist turned law 
school professor teaching international law? Briefly, what I will argue here is 
that Striking Power admittedly builds a powerful case for heightened reliance on 
increasingly autonomous weapons and weapons systems that reduce the level of 
human intervention as much as is humanly possible—whether through aerial 
drones, cyberattacks, or space weapons. That case, however, turns on merely 
plausible and decidedly contestable assumptions concerning U.S. grand strategy, 
the relatively limited constraints imposed by international law on the 
developments and use of such weapons, and their likely capacity to operate with 
appropriate limits (both in their initial targeting and freedom from uncontrolled 
escalation). However, in questioning these assumptions, this article does not 
seek to come to a final conclusion but only to suggest that Striking Power’s 
argument should not yet form the basis for policy. Many serious experts with 
more specific knowledge about weapons system and robotics, and other scholars 
of grand strategy, would challenge each of Striking Power’s explicit or implicit 
premises. More importantly, the rise of autonomous technology in war-fighting 
must be considered to have a role in increasing the dominance of economy and 
politics by technological elites. Indeed, the rise of the robots (and technology 
generally) could, as many now argue, have deleterious effects on the need for 
elites to engage the support of the larger populace to sustain the economy and 
enables elites to more effectively manipulate mass public opinion required for 
mass mobilization. If so, the rise of autonomous weapons will increasingly 
undermine an American way of war that was built on mass mobilization, 
morally-accountable and well-trained citizen soldiers, benefiting from broad-
based political support for the use of force, and support of the construction of 
international coalitions advancing a common global good. In short, if Striking 
Power is right, it cannot help but have implications for the kind of constitutional 
order best adapted to the rise of bots in war—a kind of government we do not 
now imagine and may not find attractive if we could. So, I merely seek to counter 
Rabkin and Yoo’s Pangloss with a warning from Cassandra.8 
                                                          
 5 JEREMY RABKIN & JOHN YOO, STRIKING POWER: HOW CYBER, ROBOTS, AND SPACE 
WEAPONS CHANGE THE RULES FOR WAR (2017). 
 6 John Yoo Biography, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-
faculty/faculty-profiles/john-yoo/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
 7 See Jeremy A. Rabkin, GEO. MASON U.: ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH. (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/rabkin_jeremy. 
 8 The Myth of Cassandra, GREEK MYTHS AND GREEK MYTHOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.greekmyths-greekmythology.com/the-myth-of-cassandra (stating Cassandra 
was a princess of Troy and blessed with the gift of foreseeing the future; “Her curse was that 
no one believed her.” This fact significantly influenced the destruction of Troy during the 
Trojan War). 
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I. STRIKING POWER’S DEBATABLE PREMISES 
Let me consider the premises of Striking Power before considering its 
constitutional implications. Because technology appears to drive its analysis, 
one should first examine Striking Power’s love affair with the asserted virtues 
of autonomous weapons, a passion that is not free from plausible critique. Next, 
we can locate Striking Power’s willingness to engage in this alliance with the 
bots in its intense animus for international law, or at least a particular view of 
international law, that would plausibly constrain at least some of the most 
attractive applications of remote and/or autonomous weapons. Finally, it is 
arguable that these two premises—learning to love the bots and fear of 
international law—flow from a deeper strategic premise. This seemingly 
implicit, but rather contestable, assumption may be the goal of pursuing a less 
active role in world affairs to preserve American honor from the messiness of 
engagement and cooperation in a multi-polar world dominated by authoritarian 
regimes. 
A.  Technology—The Rise of the Bots 
Yoo and Rabkin’s relative lack of technical expertise on the reliability of the 
bots may spawn the weakest premise of their argument. At the risk of caricature, 
they seem to treat theoretical possibilities as morally certain outcomes. Thus, 
they observe and then posit: 
The United States now fields thousands of UAVs both for 
reconnaissance and attack. Armed with stealth technology these 
robots gather intelligence around the clock and launch immediate 
attacks in trouble spots around the world. In the future, the most 
advanced ground and sea-based armed forces will employ remote-
controlled units, such as sentries, light armor, and littoral naval 
vessels. Advances in missile technology and precision targeting 
will allow the United States to field a conventional global-strike 
capability that can hit any target in the world within an hour. Some 
experts even predict that autonomous weapons systems will soon 
be able to act free of direct human control.9 
By contrast, Paul Scharre, former Army Ranger Sniper Team Commander in 
Afghanistan, expert at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and currently a 
Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at 
the Center for A New American Security, who has spent a better part of the last 
decade studying autonomous weapons, offers a significantly more measured 
                                                          
 9 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 5. 
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view.10 Indeed, his central contribution to the study of the new technologies is 
to locate them in a moral context that flows from his experience as an American 
soldier.11 Scharre is not alone in examining the technical, legal and moral 
debates concerning drones and their like in a balanced way.12  But his technical 
presentation for lawyers and political scientists also provides insight to two 
critical factual dimensions otherwise missing in so much discussion of the 
technological revolution of military affairs. First, Scharre draws upon the 
operational military perspective from his experience as a soldier and bureaucrat 
to inform the use of partially and fully autonomous weapons. Second, he 
provides insight into recent developments in computer science, such as the 
emergence of deep-neural networks, ranging from human programmed 
DeepBlue’s dominance over human chess players13 to DeepMind’s self-taught 
strategy that defeated the best human player in the infinitely more complex 
Chinese game of Go.14 
Indeed, focusing on the human interface with military expertise and computer 
science, Scharre begins his recent book, Army of None,15 with an account of a 
nuclear near-miss in 1983. At the height of political tensions between the U.S. 
and U.S.S.R., a single Soviet Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov’s decision to 
disregard protocol prevented a Soviet nuclear launch in response to a computer 
glitch’s erroneously perceived U.S. nuclear first-strike.16 
Scharre usefully locates the study of autonomous weapons systems in several 
larger contexts, to include broad military decision making, specific machine 
applications based on environments, and the coordination of all complex 
systems.17 To begin with, the concept of autonomy is unpacked in the context of 
the overall military decision heuristic of the observe-orient-decide-act 
                                                          
 10 Paul Scharre, CTR. NEW AM. SECURITY (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.cnas.org/people/ 
paul-scharre (“From 2008-2013, Mr. Scharre worked in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) where he played a leading role in establishing policies on unmanned and 
autonomous systems and emerging weapons technologies. Mr. Scharre led the DoD working 
group that drafted DoD Directive 3000.09, establishing the Department’s policies on 
autonomy in weapon systems.”). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See, e.g., KEN ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, DEBATING AUTONOMOUS WEAPON 
SYSTEMS, THEIR ETHICS, AND THEIR REGULATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, IN THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY, chap. 45 (2017) (rejecting a 
categorical ban on autonomous weapons and calling for a more nuanced debate). 
 13 Larry Greenemeier, 20 Years after Deep Blue: AI Has Advanced Since Conquering 
Chess, SCI. AMERICAN (June 2, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/20-years-
after-deep-blue-how-ai-has-advanced-since-conquering-chess. 
 14 See PAUL SCHARRE, ARMY OF NONE: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND THE FUTURE OF 
WAR 125 (2018). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See id. 
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(“OODA”) loop. OODA is a loop because after-action observation then feeds 
into an iterative process.18 In short, useful discussions of autonomy require focus 
on the particular phase of information processing selected.19 It follows that the 
capacity of machines to perform such tasks varies with the complexity of the 
environment. Hence, automaticity must be programed in terms of decision 
variables—ranging from single-variable, simple threshold based programs, such 
as a thermometer’s role in an automated air-conditioning system; complex, rule-
based approaches processing multiple variables; and finally goal-oriented 
programs, such as for a fully autonomous car, that would entrust the machine to 
make all decisions relevant to achieving a specified goal.20 
Finally, Scharre highlights the critical question of coordination among various 
weapons system, identifying a range of approaches that turn on the level of 
automaticity delegated to non-human decision-making. These approaches range 
from centralized coordination, with “swarm elements coordinating with a 
centralized planner”; hierarchical coordination, with “swarm elements 
controlled by ‘squad’ level agents, who are in turn controlled by higher-level 
agents”; coordination by consensus, in which “all swarm elements communicate 
with one another and then use ‘voting’ or auction-based methods to converge on 
a solutions; and emergent coordination, in which “coordination arises naturally 
with individual swarm elements reaction with one another, like animal 
swarm.”21 Scharre even locates the whole question of autonomy in weapons 
systems in the larger context of the ongoing debate over the risk of delegated 
decision-making in all human activities, ranging from thermostats to launching 
an ICBM.22 
In Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk: Ethical Autonomy Project, 
an article published prior to Army of None, Scharre recalls the image of a 
mythical half-man, half-beast known as the Centaur, to imagine the use of 
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons as “Centaur Warfighting.”23 In 
other words, depending on the details that will emerge from experience, analysis 
and good practical judgment, there will always be a role for humans in concert 
with machines. Humans as “essential operators” without which military 
engagements cannot succeed; as “moral agents,” who will judge whether or not 
                                                          
 18 See, e.g., id. at 22-23. 
 19 See id. at 43-45. 
 20 See id. at 31-32. 
 21 See id. at 20-21. 
 22 See id. at 192 (“Fire-and-forget missiles cannot be recalled once launched, but their 
freedom to search for targets in space and time is limited.”). 
 23 PAUL SCHARRE, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
AND OPERATIONAL RISK 41 (2016), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/autonomous-
weapons-and-operational-risk. 
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military necessity outweighs the potential for collateral damage; and as “fail-
safe,” with the ability to intervene if circumstances change so that an operation 
is no longer appropriate.24 In sum, unlike Striking Power, Scharre’s multiple 
layers of normative and factual analysis enable him to raise important questions 
that facilitate a sophisticated appreciation of autonomy’s risks, benefits, and 
qualifiers that call into question the promise of military effectiveness and 
collateral harm reduction. Perhaps this is because Scharre is not simply in pursuit 
of a larger legal and strategic agenda. 
It is striking that Machiavelli, known as the father of a dogmatic version of 
modern political realism, the tradition in which Striking Power is best located, 
is perhaps better understood as a more synthetic, idealistic thinker.25 Like 
Scharre, Machiavelli employed the image of the Centaur as the metaphor 
through which he explained to the Prince the relation of war to law: 
You should know, then, that there are two ways of fighting: one 
with law, the other with force: the first way is peculiar to man, the 
other to beasts: but since the first in many instances is not enough, 
it becomes necessary to resort to the second. Therefore, a prince 
must know how to make use of the beast and the man. This role 
was taught to princes indirectly by the ancient writers, who wrote 
how Achilles and many other ancient princes were given to Chiron 
the Centaur to be brought up and trained under his direction. This 
can only mean, as they had for a teacher a half-beast and half-man, 
that prince ought to know how to make use of both natures and the 
one without the other cannot endure.26 
Perhaps by invoking the image of the Centaur, Scharre locates Army of None 
in a tradition that gives equal weight to military necessity or advantage and to 
the international law of war understood as a set of moral imperatives. Here too 
his agenda may depart from Rabkin and Yoo’s goals in Striking Power. 
                                                          
 24 Id. at 45 (explaining even in “fail-safe” mode, in the event of communication loss, 
rules of engagement would still need to consider whether or not autonomous systems will be 
allowed to engage only previously authorized targets (“fail-safe”), further authorized to 
engage targets in self-defense (“fail-dangerous”), and perhaps even emergent targets of 
opportunity not specifically pre-authorized (“fail-deadly”)). 
 25 See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE ART OF CREATING POWER: FREEDMAN ON STRATEGY 284 
(Benedict Wilkinson & James Gow eds. Oxford University Press 2018) (discussing 
Machiavelli’s political idealism in terms of the ethical responsibilities of a political leader to 
serve the creation of an Italian republic); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, THE GARMENTS OF 
COURT AND PALACE: MACHIAVELLI AND THE WORLD THAT HE MADE 6-7 (Daedalus Books 
2013). 
 26 NICCOLÓ MACHIAVELLI, MACHIAVELLI’S THE PRINCE: A BILINGUAL EDITION, 145 
(Daedalus Books 2013). 
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B. International Law—Realism and Its Alternatives 
International law concerning the use of force can be divided into two 
categories. First, the jus ad bellum concerns whether or not a use of force is 
lawful and legitimate, which is now largely based on Articles 2(4) and 51 of the 
UN Charter.27 Second, the jus in bello concerns whether or not a particular use 
of force comports with rules and principles designed to regulate the manner in 
which force is used, specially the humanitarian law establishing the principles 
of necessity (requiring a definite military advantage), discrimination (avoidance 
of targeting civilians) and principles of humanity such as the avoidance of 
unnecessary suffering in the conduct of war.28 It is worth noting that Rabkin and 
Yoo engage in a sustained attack on certain interpretations of these principles 
that some have relied upon to criticize U.S. conduct on the Global War on Terror. 
They argue that international jus in bello should instead accommodate itself to 
the possibilities for increased discrimination and the avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering made possible by the emerging technologies.29 But, for present 
purposes in detailing the more expansive use of emerging technology of 
autonomous weapons as the defining element of U.S. grand strategy, it is more 
revealing to focus instead on their views concerning the jus ad bellum, 
specifically the UN Charter prohibition on the use of force, except in response 
to an armed attack or as authorized by the UN Security Council.30 
Rabkin and Yoo acknowledge that U.S. drone strikes are consistent with the 
UN Charter: 
only if we expand the concept of self-defense to include the 
anticipation of an attack, even one that may not be imminent. In 
other words, the United States might claim that anticipatory self-
defense allows preemptive strikes when the probability of an 
attack is small, but the potential for destruction is high. Or the 
United States and its allies must admit that they are engaging in 
preventive war designed to nip challenges to international security 
in the bud, even when there is no immediate claim to self-
defense.31 
                                                          
 27 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, art. 51. 
 28 See generally GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 14 (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press 2013). 
 29 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 13 (“Yet many scholarly commentators and 
government officials still tend to view the law of war in quite formalist ways. They rely on 
textual provisions of AP I [the 1977 Additional Protocol to the 1949 Conventions on the 
Law of War], U.M. resolutions, and even dicta found in ICJ ruling and advisory opinions.”). 
 30 Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN 
Charter Regime, 24 ELIJ 151, 151 (2013). 
 31 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 27. 
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The implicit premise here is either that the UN Charter conception of the 
international law concerning the use of force is more elastic and responsive to 
changing technology than others may believe or that, if the UN Charter is not 
amenable to flexible interpretation, it ought to be disregarded when it does not 
conform to a single nation’s appreciation of its national interest or its subjective 
judgment of the global interest. As suggested by historian Isabel Hull’s 
discussion of the British and German response to the legal challenges presented 
by the revolution in military affairs concerning aerial bombardment and the 
emergence of the submarine in A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making 
International Law During the Great War,32 Yoo and Rabkin’s methodological 
claims are more akin to the overall standpoint of German lawyers during World 
War I than to those of their British counterparts. Here, I want only to explain 
how these methodological premises revealed in Anglo-German debate, given 
their timeliness at the centenary of the end of the Great War, are again at issue 
in the premises of Yoo and Rabkin’s argument. In short, their view of 
international law would ally the U.S. now with the approach of Germany 
whereas our traditional views are of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
The German position, in brief, considered international law to be an 
incomplete system in which specific accommodations had been reached to 
address particular issues.33 It followed that there were gaps in the law, so-called 
non liquets; and one principal form of gap was the emergence of new 
technologies in warfare, including the submarine. It followed that the rules 
would not govern attacks on vessels, including civilian and even neutral 
commerce that had been developed in a world of cruisers. Cruisers could 
effectively capture contraband without unnecessary loss of life and without 
significant risk to the capturing vessel. The rules governing these attacks were 
simply ill-adapted to submarines, which could not capture vessels engaging in 
unpermitted commerce without civilian casualties or undue risk to the submarine 
itself or its crew.34 Moreover, even if the international law governing cruisers 
did apply to the activities of submarines, the use of submarines would 
nonetheless be justified by political considerations.35 Indeed, the humane path 
was a maximum use of force in order to bring unnecessary suffering to an end, 
                                                          
 32 See ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: BREAKING AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW DURING THE GREAT WAR 174-175 (Cornell University 2014) [A Scrap of Paper]. 
 33 Anne-Charlotte Martineau, The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in 
International Law, 22 LEIDEN J INT’L. L. 1, 1-2 (2009) (discussing the general European 
view on international law); see Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the 
Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 265, 270 (2009) (discussing 
fragmentation of international law from the German practitioner’s perspective). 
 34 See HULL, supra note 31, at 197; see also Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and 
the World Court, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 399, 429-34 (1997) (discussing non-liquet in the 
context of its application of the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion). 
 35 See HULL, supra note 31, at 221. 
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since “a quick war is the most human.”36 
The British, by contrast, argued against discontinuities in international law, 
such as non-liquets brought about by a revolution in military technology. This 
perhaps reflected the difference between Anglo-American common law 
reasoning and civilian approaches based on statutory solutions. In the German 
view, there had not been new international legislation or even bilateral contracts 
regarding the new weapons. By contract, the British generally believed that 
“customs, state practices, and Prize Court decisions”— which implemented the 
law concerning neutrals rights to be free from capture when engaging in neutral 
commerce before a neutral adjudicator—were “the kinds of precedents that 
indicated law.”37 Hence, Britain argued that “all vessels were subject to the rules 
of humanity that dictated saving passengers and crew before sinking merchant 
ships.”38 Thus, the British view treated international law, not as a set of 
conditional commitments based on particular balances of advantage, but rather 
an underlying set of moral imperatives of a community of states. According to 
Hull, it could be described as Britain’s: 
self-conception as a law-abiding state, its domestic government, 
its sense of international law as a product of a society of states to 
which Britain belonged and aspired to lead, its consequent 
recognition of other states as their interests as formative of law, its 
understanding that its own interests varied over time, and 
circumstance (as a neutral trader or as a belligerent), its awareness 
of its independence of the Prize Court and the Privy council as 
appeals court, and its concern for the often different views of its 
own allies.39 
The difference between these British and German views arguably corresponds 
to the modern divide between the so-called “realist” and “constructivist” 
understandings of international law, a debate which shows no sign of abating, at 
least in academic circles.40 For it reflects a debate on the priority of law over 
politics, or politics over law, as much as it also reflects distinct views on both 
politics and on the nature of international law, such as through the legislation of 
the UN Security Council or treaty-making by states, rather than found or natural 
                                                          
 36 Id. at 230. 
 37 Id. at 195. 
 38 Id. at 197. 
 39 Id. at 206-07. 
 40 Compare JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 
(Oxford University Press 2005) (advancing the realist view that takes interests as givens and 
defined largely by material circumstances); with OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, 
THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD 27 
(Simon & Schuster 2017) (the constructivist perspective that defines interests as emerging 
out ideals). 
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law or jus cogens. Neither of these extremes, however, reflects the received 
grand strategy of U.S. foreign policy, which arguably mediated both during and 
after the Cold War between interests and ideals. 
C.  Grand Strategy—The Challenge to Democratic Enlargement 
Striking Power’s promise is that: 
Robotics, cyber, and space weapons can reduce the size of ground 
forces needed to wage war. They can withdraw human soldiers 
from the battlefield while making attacks more precise and deadly. 
They can allow nations to coerce each other without inflicting the 
same level of casualties and destruction as in the past. They can 
reach far beyond borders to pick out terrorists or selectively 
destroy WMD sites. They can reduce the costs that discourage 
western nations from stopping humanitarian disasters or civil 
wars. While armed conflict will continue as a feature of the human 
condition, it might come at lower cost, for a shorter time, and with 
less violence.41 
But one might argue that this is grand strategy on the cheap, one that responds 
only to extreme problems with minimal footprint and is geared toward premature 
exit strategies that would leave behind the root causes of the problems that 
caused the instabilities that first prompted intervention. It is a strategy that 
reverses the lessons of World War I, after which the U.S. turned isolationist, 
lessons that were learned well enough to warrant U.S. deployments in Europe, 
South Korea and Japan now for three-quarters of a century after the end of the 
conflicts that initially brought them there. The established U.S. strategy in the 
post-Cold War environment is best summarized in the Clinton Administration’s 
so-called strategy of democratic enlargement42 and President Bush’s Second 
Inaugural Address,43 both of which were premised on the idea that the internal 
structure of other states as democratic polities was a necessary condition of U.S. 
national security. The question Rabkin and Yoo pose is whether or not the spread 
of democracy through U.S. engagement remains essential to the maintenance of 
world order in which the U.S. has thrived since the end of World War II, or 
whether the U.S. would be even better off through a different national grand 
strategy.44 
                                                          
 41 RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 3. 
 42 THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND 
ENLARGEMENTS 2 (1996). 
 43 George W. Bush, President of The U.S., Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005) 
(transcript available in The Avalon Project at Yale Law School). 
 44 See JAMES M. LINDSAY & IVO H. DAALDER, THE EMPTY THRONE: AMERICA’S 
ABDICATION OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 1-3 (2018) (providing a balanced appraisal of the 
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Of course, grand strategy is largely about the relationship between available 
means and the ends that best fit those means.45 According to one perceptive 
observer, the massive retaliation strategy in the event of any nuclear first use 
was constructed primarily to relate U.S. military strategy to the Eisenhower 
administration’s judgment that preservation of the status quo in Europe, meaning 
deterrence of Soviet invasion, could not be achieved solely by conventional 
forces.46 Rather, the threat of use of nuclear weapons would be necessary for 
deterrence.  Moreover, a politically-unsustainable burden on the U.S. economy 
is avoidable by reducing the costs of conventional defense.47 This strategic shift 
appears to be the premise driving Striking Power’s resistance to theories of 
international law that are based on consensual and incremental change, what it 
describes as “frozen law in a changing world.”48 Thus one wonders whether or 
not Rabkin and Yoo’s technological optimism and restrictive theory of 
international law, like the Eisenhower administrations flirtation with MAD, are 
necessary corollaries of their preferred grand strategy. 
Recently, at least one military strategist has offered a contrary view. Michael 
O’Hanlon, a former advisor to the CIA, adjunct professor at both Princeton and 
Columbia University, and currently a Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution,49 contends that for the foreseeable future the U.S. will require large-
scale army and marine units to achieve its national security objectives.50 
O’Hanlon writes: 
The goal is not to undertake a number of imminent large-scale 
missions; we have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan about the 
limits, challenges, and the costs of such operations. But . . . 
deterrence of other great powers as well as smaller powers such as 
North Korea, and of being able to help stabilize key trouble spots 
that may be afflicted with various forms of civil warfare, terrorism, 
natural disaster, or other maladies, require substantial American 
                                                          
Trump administration’s strategic shift from engagement in the direction of isolationism). 
 45 See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, ON GRAND STRATEGY 21-22 (Penguin Press 2018) 
(explaining that all of humanity has been using relationships to garner an advantage as a 
strategy); see generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Oxford 1982). 
 46 See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, ON GRAND STRATEGY 59, 267, 304 (Penguin Press 2018); 
JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 145-49, 187-88, 204-05 (Oxford 1982). 
 47 See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, ON GRAND STRATEGY 59, 267, 304 (Penguin Press 2018) 
(explaining that the Cold War never became a real ‘hot’ war because of the nuclear weapon 
deterrence and containment strategies used to maintain the status quo); JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, 
STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 145-49, 187-88, 204-05 (Oxford 1982). 
 48 See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 4, at 9-14. 
 49 See Michael E. O’Hanlon Biography, BROOKINGS INSTIT., 
https://www.brookings.edu/experts/michael-e-ohanlon/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019). 
 50 MICHEL E. O’HANLON, THE FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE, xii-xiii (2015). 
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ground forces. Drones, cyberwarfare, and special forces cannot do 
it all; pretending that we can turn our backs on insurgency simply 
because Iraq and Afghanistan proved so hard is not viable either.51 
O’Hanlon thus refers to the “so-called revolution in military affairs,”52 and 
maintains that “robotics and advanced computing” are yet “redefining warfare 
in a radical way.”53 In short, O’Hanlon’s alternative universe is premised on the 
need for continued and expensive deployments performing missions for which 
the bots cannot substitute. 
In sum, Striking Power imagines a world of low technological risks, low legal 
constraint, and limited U.S. global engagement. Scharre, Hull and O’Hanlon 
would undoubtedly each disagree with at least one of these premises (and 
perhaps all three). But it is equally fair to consider the possibility that Rabkin 
and Yoo are correct, that these premises describe the world as it is and will be 
as this iteration of the ongoing revolution in military affairs proceeds. But even 
if that is the world we are entering, it will not be without risks for the very 
constitutional order Rabkin and Yoo, as scholars of American constitutional law 
and history, would almost certainly wish to preserve. 
II. WHY STRIKING POWER’S BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT MAY 
NOT BE OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
Athenian democracy, in the words of Philip Bobbitt, commenced an 
“epochal” war—meaning a war whose resolution signaled a discontinuity in the 
form of the state, one that ultimately culminated in the defeat of Greek city-states 
by Macedonian Monarchy.54 But for our purposes, the rise of Athenian 
democratic power, and the plausibility of its claim to superiority over Spartan 
autocracy and even Persian Monarchy, rested on the Greek citizen-sailor.55 As 
Victor Davis Hanson observes, it was the expertise of Athenian sailors, 
developed over years of commitment to their craft, that assured Athenian 
maritime superiority, and thus the basis for Athens’s power and strategy.56 And 
what assured this commitment? It was that,  
[a]t least at the start of the war, at Athens the rowers were for the 
most part all free voting citizens in a manner not true of the 
Peloponnesian fleet, suggesting that there unique élan at sea was a 
                                                          
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 15. 
 53 Id. at 166. 
 54 See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF 
HISTORY 21-23 (2002). 
 55 See VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER: HOW THE ATHENIANS AND 
SPARTANS FOUGHT THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 251 (Random House 2005). 
 56 Id. at 251-52. 
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reflection that oarsmen felt that they had a state in the very society 
they rowed to defend.57  
Will that be true for the U.S. military in the age of the robots? Will the 
irrelevance of mass forces make mass voters irrelevant too? Increasingly the 
Congress fails to discharge it responsibility to police the Executive Branch’s use 
of force. 
Already commentators perceive the risk that in our economy and society vast 
numbers are being left behind and becoming unnecessary to the production of 
the intellectual property that now comprises the largest portion of American 
wealth.58 With Orwellian overtones, another commentator observes that the 
robotics revolution insofar as it increases military capacity to confront urban 
insurgency has important implications for domestic liberty and privacy.59 
Antitrust scholars point to the increasing concentration of economic power in 
fewer hands, as the computing revolution of the last quarter century appears to 
have spawned higher concentration ratios in virtually all U.S. industries, not only 
those in the computer sector.60 This concentration of power and freedom from 
dependence on the U.S. government has reportedly now enabled at least one 
U.S. corporation, presumably Google, to refuse to do business with the Defense 
Department, subordinating the national interest to that elite corporation’s other 
agendas.61 
In short, dominance of the commanding heights of U.S. technology by a 
fortunate few, coupled with a grand strategy that diminishes the need for broad-
based support for a largely citizen-military and a diminution of a once “decent 
                                                          
 57 Id. at 253. 
 58 See Yuval Noah Harari, Why Technology Favors Tyranny, THE ATLANTIC  
(Oct. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/yuval-noah-harari-
technology-tyranny/568330/. 
 59 See Chris Meserole, Wars of None: AI, Big Data, and the Future of Insurgency, 
LAWFARE (July 1, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/wars-none-ai-big-data-and-future-
insurgency. 
 60 See JAMES BESSEN, THE POLICY CHALLENGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, B.U. SCH. 
L.: L. & ECON. at 2 (Research Paper) (July 2018). 
 61 See. e.g., Rob Gillies, US military chief says tech giants should work with Pentagon, 
FOX NEWS (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/us-military-chief-says-tech-
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develop AI for use in weapons); Heather Wilson, Air Force Secretary: The Law of War and 
the Power of Computing, THE NAT’L INT. (Sept. 4, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/ 
feature/air-force-secretary-law-war-and-power-computing-30057 (“[W]hen a handful of 
large companies control the power of Artificial Intelligence, it raises questions about that 
entities will make decision about its application and its impact on our lives in the United 
States and around the world. We may be living in a time when power is shifting again, not 
toward popes or feudal lords, but to companies who control tools that learn and act in ways 
that we are only beginning to understand.”). 
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respect to the opinions of mankind,”62 may have truly terrifying implications for 
the survival of the U.S. form of government. This is, of course, a Cassandra’s 
tale. But the trends are disturbing. And if epochal war is to come, it may well be 
that the country that best marries human technical ingenuity and humanity’s 
commitment to law and morality, the Centaur in short, will be the one most likely 
to survive. Dr. Strangelove ends with such a warning; for, as the bombs fall and 
the Doomsday Machine is automatically triggered, the U.S. President’s military 
and political advisors begin to calculate how to survive in mine shafts to be 
constructed for the chosen few during decades of planetary inhabitability, 
leaving their fellow citizens and the mores of their culture behind.63 One can be 
forgiven for hoping that Striking Power’s aim is less than true. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 62 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 63 PETER GEORGE, DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND 
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